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This paper explores the relationship between Republicanism and the capability approach. While these views and the notions of freedom they endorse are distinct, it is argued that when we trace some of the antecedents of the capability approach notably in the works of Karl Marx these approaches are more closely connected than one might expect from an exchange between Philip Pettit and Amartya Sen. It is, for this reason, unsurprising that Pettit uses the capability approach in advancing his Republican view, though in ways which are quite different from Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s specific proposals. Nonetheless, I argue that development of the capability approach also converges with the Republican view once one explicitly lists capabilities relating to self-respect and dignity in the way that Nussbaum does in her version of the approach. I illustrate this point in the context of disability. 
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Some Reflections on Capability and Republican Freedom
0.	Introduction.
In Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World Philip Pettit (2014) traces the roots of the Republican view of freedom and contrasts it with an alternative view which sees freedom in terms of ‘non-interference’. In ‘A Brief History of Liberty – and Its Lessons’ Pettit further expands on his earlier works and argues for ‘a return to the republican way of thinking about freedom’ (Pettit, 2016, p. 2 in the unpublished manuscript). To explain the Republican view Pettit focusses on the case of Nora in Henrik Ibsen’s celebrated play A Doll’s House. In that play, Pettit (2014, p. xiv) argues that Nora is able to do whatever she pleases – within the parameters set by the male dominated society of her time - but only because her husband, Torvald Helmer allows her to. She is generally ‘free’ to pursue her desires but only because of the good will of her husband who hardly interferes in her choices (only banning her consumption of macaroons, which does not act as much of a restriction because she can hide them in her skirts). In Pettit’s terms she has ‘free rein’, but because her husband can at any time pull in the reins, she is not free in the Republican sense of ‘non-domination’. She is not free because she can exercise her choices only because she has the good fortune of being married to a husband who allows the exercise of these choices. Pettit (2014, pp. 5-13) traces the roots of this notion of freedom to the Roman Republic and to Polybius in particular, and its subsequent history including its endorsement by Niccolo Machiavelli amongst others. He argues that this sense of freedom was, over time, eclipsed and forgotten when the notion of freedom as ‘non-interference’ emerged and became dominant. His Republican view reclaims the view of freedom as non-domination for the modern age.
This notion of freedom is certainly a close relative of the approaches taken by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen in developing their views about capability. In this paper I comment on a few salient issues relating to capability and the Republican view. In discussing ‘capability’, I shall generally rely on an intuitive notion of capability as the ability or power to be and do various things, where the relevant ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ are ‘functionings’, avoiding more technical definitions and explaining different senses of ‘capability’ where necessary. An exchange between Pettit (2001) and Sen (2001) brings out some of the potential differences between Republican and capability views. I argue that the historical antecedents of the capability approach - notably its echoes in the works of Karl Marx - suggest that there is more in common between the two approaches than one might guess from the exchange between Pettit and Sen.  Indeed, I argue that, in part for this reason, Martha Nussbaum’s more recent version of her view – which, where necessary, I shall refer to as the ‘capabilities approach’ to distinguish it from Sen’s view - even though Sen himself has referred to his approach as the ‘capabilities approach’ in his early statements of it (for example, Sen, 1984,  513) – addresses some of the relevant concerns which motivate the Republican view through some items on her list of ‘central human capabilities’. Given the common ground between these views, it is also unsurprising that Pettit uses a variation of Sen’s notion of ‘basic capability’ in his works, though as we shall see the notion of basic capability Pettit uses differs from those that Sen and Nussbaum use in articulating their own views.  I argue that once one endorses the value of some functioning such as ‘self-respect’ (or ‘the social bases of self-respect’) and includes the ability to achieve this in a list of capabilities, some potential differences between the two approaches are less striking than they seem in the exchange between Sen and Pettit and indeed some of the concerns that motivate Pettit’s view can be accommodated in the capability view. I illustrate this point in the context of disability.
1.	Historical Roots of the View of Development as Capability Expansion
The historical antecedents of the capability approach are very different to those of the Republican view as it is elaborated by Pettit in his ‘A Brief History of Liberty – And Its Lessons’. In an early statement of his view that development involves a ‘capability expansion’, Sen (1990) traces the historical roots of the capability approach to the works of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith and Karl Marx. As we shall see, Pettit’s own ‘positive’ use of the capability approach picks up on its Smithian heritage. I will argue that Sen’s citation of some passages from Marx helps to illustrate the convergence and relationship between the Republican view and Sen’s approach, at least in its early articulation as a view of development. 
Sen cites a number of Marx’s texts. In one well-known passage from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 which Sen cites, Marx tells us that: ‘it will be seen how in the place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human life-activities – the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need’ (Sen, 1990, p. 43, citing Marx, 1977). This passage is used to motivate a point regularly made in work on the capability approach which emphasises the importance of shifting attention from income, resources and wealth to the things human beings can do and be, towards the (valuable) functionings which constitute a flourishing life – and the importance of focussing on ends and not just on means. The same passage was earlier cited at the head of Martha Nussbaum’s earliest paper on capability which relates Aristotle’s views on political distribution to the capability approach (see Nussbaum, 1988, p. 145 as well as Nussbaum, 1990 and 1992). Sen also cites a passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle tells us that: [t]he life of money making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else’ (Aristotle, 1984, 1732; cited in Sen, 1990, p. 44).  A similar point about means and ends is made in Marx’s remarks about ‘commodity fetishism’ – which suggest that in a capitalist society commodities acquire a value independent from their uses (see, for example, Marx, 1990, p. 176). But in advancing the capability approach as an approach to development, Sen also cites a passage from Marx and Friedrich Engel’s The German Ideology of 1845-6. Sen writes that: 
[c]apability reflects a person’s freedom to choose between different ways of living. The underlying motivation – the focusing on freedom – is well captured by Marx’s claim that what we need is ‘replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances’. (Sen, 1990, 44)
If one accepts that Marx’s claim captures the sense of freedom involved in the capability approach, one might well suppose that the capability perspective will favour the view that Nora is not free. Nora can choose - on Pettit’s reading (Pettit, 2014, p. 2) - to do whatever she likes within the norms of her time, but only because her circumstances are fortunate. And if we follow Marx, in arguing that we need to liberate people from the domination of chance and circumstances, then Nora’s freedom to do as she pleases should not be merely a matter of good fortune or favourable circumstances. The thought is that to be free she should, in some sense and to some significant degree, be master of her destiny and have significant control of her life in a way that she does not because, as Pettit emphasises, her husband can ‘rein her in’ at any time he pleases.  So if Sen intends ‘capability’ to be understood in the sense that is – on my reading - at work in Marx’s text, then the capability approach certainly converges to some significant degree with Pettit’s view of freedom as non-domination.  
The underlying notion of freedom at work in Marx’s text is a form of what Isaiah Berlin termed ‘positive freedom’. As Berlin articulated this idea: ‘[t]he ‘positive’ sense of liberty derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of any kind. I wish to be an instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of will’ (Berlin, 1969, p. 131). Berlin distinguishes this sense of liberty from the ‘negative’ sense: ‘[p]olitical liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree …’ (Berlin, 1969, p. 122).  In his earlier writings, Pettit (1997, p. 27) tells us that the notion of freedom as non-domination which emerges from the Republican tradition is usually seen as one that ‘prizes positive liberty above all else’ (no doubt because on the view of freedom as non-domination, we do not wish to be ‘the instrument … of other men’s acts of will’). But Pettit (1997, pp. 27-31) argues that the Republican view of freedom is not merely a form of positive freedom. He suggests that it involves both positive and negative elements. As he puts it: ‘[t]his conception is negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others, not necessarily the presence of self-mastery’ and it is ‘positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something more than the absence of interference; it requires security against interference, in particular against interference on an arbitrary basis’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 51). For this reason, Pettit insists that freedom as non-domination ‘represents a control that a person enjoys in relation to their own destiny and such control constitutes one familiar type of power: the power of the agent who can prevent various ill-happenings to them’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 69). Because the Republican view has this positive element, it is unsurprising that it is related to the capability approach, since the relevant ‘power’ might be conceived of as a form of, or in terms of, capability.
	Sen does repeatedly and explicitly mention the notion of positive freedom in early articulations of the capability approach. For example, in his essay ‘Rights and Capabilities’ he writes that ‘the capability to function is the thing that comes closest to the notion of positive freedom’ (Sen, 1984, p. 316). In later articulations, notably in his Development as Freedom, Sen does not use the notion of positive freedom (or indeed the contrast between positive freedom and negative freedom which is associated with Berlin) as much. And to the degree that he cites a notion of positive freedom in his later discussions it is T.H. Green’s notion which is closest to the notion of capability. In one context Sen cites the following text from Green: ‘[w]hen we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying’ (Sen, 2002, p. 586). Nussbaum (2011, p. 142) also cites Green as an influence on her version of the approach and attributes to Green the argument that: ‘to protect human freedom was to create conditions in which all sorts were able to make a wide range of choices with sufficient protection from society’ (see also Nussbaum, 2007, p. 55). 
In Development as Freedom, even though Sen says rather less about ‘positive freedom’ the notion of having control over one’s destiny also emerges when he cites the ‘medieval distinction between “the patient” and “the agent”’ and suggests that – in the light of various connections between different forms of freedom - ‘[w]ith adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other’ (Sen, 1999, pp. 10-11). Furthermore, he still argues that capability captures a person’s opportunities or powers and emphasises the contrast between ‘opportunity’ and ‘process’ aspects of freedom (Sen, 1999, p. 17) where ‘non-interference’ falls under the process aspect (Sen, 2002, p. 586). Indeed, one central point of convergence between Sen and Pettit is that they both believe that there is more to freedom than ‘non-interference’. 
Even if Sen reduces his emphasis on positive freedom in some of the later works on capability, the views of both Sen and Nussbaum would lead one to be concerned about Nora’s situation. If her desires or preferences have adapted to the circumstances of male domination and can be easily fulfilled because she is given ‘free rein’ it is not clear that we should judge that her life is going well or that she is free, since on all versions of the capability view desires and preferences may be distorted and provide an unhelpful guide to how a person’s life is going or whether she is genuinely free. 
This point is particularly well illustrated by A Doll’s House. As we approach the dramatic end of Ibsen’s play, Nora re-examines her life and sees it in a new light. When Torvald asks her: ‘[h]aven’t you been happy?’ she replies ‘no, that’s something I’ve never been’. She tells Torvald that: [y]ou arranged everything to suit your own tastes, and so I came to have the same tastes as yours … or I pretended to …’. (Ibsen, 1965, p. 226). And so with hindsight Nora would not think that the flexibility she had to do as she desired in her marriage to Torvald was genuine ‘freedom’ in any sense. In explaining why she must leave her husband, she adds that: ‘I must stand on my own two feet if I am to get to know myself and the world outside’ and ‘I must try to educate myself’ (Ibsen, 1965, p. 227). To some degree, I suggest that Nora’s decision to leave her husband here is driven by a need to be positively free and to expand her capabilities, not merely a desire to be free from domination, even if it is hard to distinguish these in her explanation of why she feels she must leave her husband. Indeed some of her lines are potentially illuminated by work on capability. When Nora says that ‘[n]ow that I come to look at it, I’ve lived here as a pauper’ (Ibsen, 1965, p. 226), she seems implicitly to invoke Marx’s ‘rich human being… in need of a totality of human life-activities’ since by the standard of the ‘rich human being’ her life is impoverished and her need is not fulfilled. On this reading, the notion of capability and the historical tradition that informs it also provide an important insight into Nora’s condition and her decision to leave her husband at the end of Ibsen’s masterpiece. Indeed, themes in literary works concerned with the subordinate position of women and their search for freedom are also picked up in work on capability including Nussbaum’s discussion of Rabindranath Tagore’s ‘Letter from a Wife’ (see, for example, Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 44-5).
2.	Sen’s Response to Pettit.
In discussing Sen’s view of freedom and the capability approach, Pettit writes that ‘this defence of Sen on freedom and capability, if it is right, reveals a deep connection between his way of thinking and the approach to freedom and government that I think of as republican in character’ (Pettit, 2001, p. 17). Without entering into the details, I should add that in responding to Pettit, Sen (2009, p. 305) takes him to be raising a serious objection to, rather than mounting a defence of, the capability approach. In one of his responses to Pettit’s discussion, Sen observes that the Republican view of freedom is limited by its ‘single focus understanding of freedom’ (Sen, 2009, p. 308). I doubt very much that Pettit would object to this observation. Pettit (2014, p. 31) freely admits that – as he puts it – the notion of freedom is elastic and that, in developing his Republican view, he has ‘regimented’ it, and he gives his reasons for regimenting the language of freedom in developing the Republican view (Pettit, 2014, p. 33). Nonetheless, Sen stresses the different aspects of freedom in his response (Sen, 2001, p. 54) no doubt because freedom as non-domination is distinct from (even it if sometimes related to) the opportunity aspect of freedom and Sen has always stressed the many sided nature of freedom as a value. 
In the central part of his response to Pettit, Sen argues that the capability view should not be subsumed under the Republican view. In particular, he argues that the Republican view can distinguish certain situations which the capability approach does not. He (Sen, 2001, p. 54 and 2009, p. 306) distinguishes the following three cases:
Case 1: Person A is disabled, and is not helped by others, and she is, thus unable to go out of her house.
Case 2: Person A is disabled, and is always helped by volunteers with goodwill, and she is, thus, fully able to go out of the house whenever she wants to move around freely.
Case 3: Person A is disabled, but has well-remunerated servants who obey and have to obey – her command, and she is fully able to go out of her house whenever she wants and to move around freely.
If one sets aside the question of the subservience of the servants in case 3, and focusses only on the freedom of person A, Sen argues that in case 3 person A has Republican freedom, whereas in case 2 she does not because in case 2, person A is dependent on the goodwill of volunteers. Yet, he thinks that person A is free to move around in case 2 as well. By contrast, the Republican view will deny that person A is free to move around in case 2. I suggest that here Sen is concerned primarily with whether or not person A enjoys the same opportunity in each situation – and to the degree that she enjoys the opportunity to go out of the house and so on in cases 2 and 3, the capability approach will not distinguish the two scenarios.
Of course, the story can be complicated somewhat so that the capability approach might distinguish cases 2 and 3 just as the Republican view can. Suppose that, for whatever reason, person A’s self-respect requires that she is not dependent on volunteers to help her move around freely. Suppose that person A can then realise her ability to have self-respect in case 3, because she is not dependent on volunteers, but has her own staff but not in case 2. Here I have not introduced the Republican view of freedom but simply complicated the story so that there is more than one valued functioning to consider. Of course, Sen’s point that on the Republican view cases 1 and 2 both involve unfreedom remains relevant in explaining why the capability view cannot be ‘subsumed’ under the Republican view and it is important to be able to distinguish cases 1 and 2. My point is only that it is not hard to see how the capability approach might also distinguish cases 2 and 3, without invoking the Republican view. Indeed, once one accepts the importance of valued functionings like achieving self-respect which - while Sen does not advance any all-encompassing list of valued functionings – he often mentions (see, for example, Sen, 1993, p. 36) the capability approach can address some of the concerns raised by the Republican view to the degree that dependency on the goodwill of others can undermine self-respect. As we shall see, Nussbaum’s version of the approach does explicitly list ‘having the social bases of self-respect’ in her list of ‘central human capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 76-8) so that her capabilities approach might also be able to distinguish cases 2 and 3 – or variants of these cases. 
3.	Basic Capability, Poverty and a Social Minimum
Having dwelt on some of the potential connections and divergences between capability views and the Republican view of freedom, I now turn to one part of Pettit’s work where he endorses and attempts to develop a variation of the capability view in his own Republican theory. In explaining that theory in Just Freedom he writes that ‘justice requires insurance for individuals and groups against various ills’ (Pettit, 2014, p. 86). In this context he writes that people should be ‘assured of access to what Amartya Sen (1985) and Martha Nussbaum (2006) describe as the basic capabilities for functioning in society’.  This remark is made alongside the suggestion that people should be provided at a basic level with ‘social security, medical security, and judicial security, whether by means of a system of social insurance, national health, and legal assistance, or by any number of alternatives – say, the provision of a basic income for each citizen’. Pettit is clearly concerned with provision of a social minimum and sees the capability approach as helpful in this context. 
Pettit’s endorsement of the notion of ‘basic capabilities’ associated with Nussbaum and Sen is not, however, much developed in Just Freedom and it is hard to interpret here not least because Nussbaum and Sen use the term ‘basic capabilities’ in very different ways. And in as much as Pettit’s discussion emerges in the context of the question of what might constitute an adequate social minimum which everyone should be guaranteed, it may be that, in citing Nussbaum’s view he has in mind Nussbaum’s proposal that, as a matter of justice, everyone should attain a threshold level in terms of items on a list of capabilities. Nonetheless, one of Pettit’s further elaborations of the idea of ‘basic functional capability’ in the context of a social minimum is found in a discussion of Sen, and that is where I begin.
In ‘Republicanism Across Cultures’ Pettit (forthcoming) suggests that an argument that Sen advances in his paper ‘Poor Relatively Speaking’ can be used to defend a universal list of basic liberties which can be interpreted and filled out differently in different cultures. This proposal is similar to Nussbaum’s proposal which involves a list of capabilities which is vague and open-ended so that it can be filled out differently in different times and cultures. In ‘Republicanism across Cultures’ (forthcoming, p. 26) Pettit also suggests that in his earlier (2001) paper (to which Sen responded) he has ‘argued … that a charitable interpretation of the ideal of basic functional capability should lead us to take it as an ideal of a fundamentally republican kind’.​[1]​  In developing his argument, Pettit cites Sen’s well known claim that poverty is a ‘basic capability failure’, where – on Sen’s account - ‘basic capability’ is taken to refer to the ability to achieve certain crucially important functionings up to minimally adequate levels (see, for example, Sen, 1993, p. 41). Sen has famously argued that poverty has ‘an absolutist core’ to the degree that there is failure of basic capability. Nonetheless, it is ‘relative’ to the degree that the resources or income needed to realise the relevant capability or functioning(s) can depend on one’s position relative to others in society or indeed on what is considered ‘normal’ in society. It is in this context that Sen famously cited a passage of Adam Smith’s in The Wealth of Nations where he writes that:
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but what ever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without … Custom … has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. (Sen, 1984, p. 333).
In this context Sen argues that the ability to appear in public without shame is absolute – in the sense that it does not depend on how much (shame) one experiences or ‘has’ relative to others. As Sen puts it: 
In this view to be able to avoid shame, an eighteenth-century Englishman has to have leather shoes. It may be true that this situation has come to pass precisely because the typical members of that community happen to possess leather shoes, but the person in question needs leather shoes not so much to be less ashamed than others – that relative question is not even posed by Adam Smith – but simply not to be ashamed, which as an achievement is an absolute one (Sen, 1984, p. 333).
Nonetheless, the resource requirement for avoiding shame might, on this logic, specify how much one has relative to others, because it depends on what is typical in society. Pettit develops on Sen’s text to make two distinct claims. The first is a claim that Sen also advances: that the resources which are required to achieve basic capability – assuming that appearing in public without shame is indeed ‘basic’ – will vary from context to context (Sen, 1984, p. 335). But going further, Pettit’s underlying conception of ‘basic functional capability’ follows the passage from Smith that Sen cites and ties the universal appeal of a norm of ‘equal functional capability’ to ‘[t]he fact that capability is connected to living without shame as a creditable person of the society, as Smith expresses this ideal’ (Pettit, forthcoming, p. 6). Pettit thus ties the notion of ‘equal’ or ‘basic functional capability’ to a person’s status in society.  When he asks himself the question of how much in the way of resources would be adequate to have this status, he cites what he calls the ‘eyeball test’. This test requires that people have enough resources to count as equals as regards freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 2014, p. 99). If this is not so, and you lack the resources to function adequately in society then - Pettit tells us that - ‘you are likely to live in fear of how the rich and powerful will treat you, should you speak your mind frankly or exercise no caution about whom you associate with’ (Pettit, 2014, p. xix). 
It should be clear here that – by linking the notion of ‘basic capability’ to freedom as non-domination – Pettit advances his own standard for a social minimum as regards resources. And while this standard is inspired by Sen’s work, it is not equivalent to any proposal that Sen himself advances. While Sen’s approach allows us to look directly at basic capability failure, and indeed allows those who wish to apply the approach to use a list, and indicators, of quite basic functionings relating to nutrition, literacy, health and so on to carry out evaluations of poverty within and between nations in the way that the United Nations Development Programme (various years) and others have done, Pettit’s approach would be far more informationally demanding – asking us to take into account differences in norms across nations in evaluating the (personal, natural and social) resources required for ‘basic functional capability’ in society. It would involve a novel approach to international comparisons of the realisation of ‘basic functional capability’ in society. The approach would also be hard to use in making comparisons across all countries because, as we shall see, it would potentially involve different lists of ‘basic functional capabilities’ in countries at different levels of development. And if it involves calculating resource requirements for the exercise of ‘basic functional capabilities’, Sen’s writings on capability suggest that these would be relative.
	As we saw, Pettit also cites Martha Nussbaum’s work in his discussion of ‘basic functional capability’.  Nussbaum’s notion of basic capability is quite different from Sen’s. It relates to: ‘the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for developing the more advanced capabilities, and a ground of moral concern’ (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 84). Beyond ‘basic capability’, Nussbaum defines ‘internal capabilities’ as ‘developed states of the person herself that are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions’ (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 84). Finally she defines ‘combined capabilities’ which are internal capabilities combined with ‘suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function’ (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 85). Realisation of items on the list of capabilities Nussbaum advances thus includes not merely developing their internal powers but also requires an environment that ‘is favourable to the exercise of practical reason and the other major functions’.  And on Nussbaum’s approach the social goal is, in each case, to get citizens above the relevant threshold for the combined capability. To this degree, the goal is to provide a social minimum and not merely a threshold of what Nussbaum calls ‘basic capability’. 
Nussbaum’s list categorises central human capabilities under ten categories, some of which have sub-categories. Two entries, which fall under the category of ‘affiliation’ are: ‘having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation’; and ‘being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others’ and she adds that: ‘[t]his entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 77). These items on Nussbaum’s list clearly do some of the work Pettit does with his notion of ‘basic functional capability’ in society. And other items on the list – such as those that fall under the title of ‘senses, imagination and thought’ and of ‘control over one’s environment’ are close relatives of items that Pettit lists as ‘basic liberties’ – such as freedom of thought, speech, association and religion (Pettit, 2014, p. 72) - in developing his Republican theory. This observation should help clarify the relationship between Pettit’s rather specific use of the notion of ‘basic functional capability’ and Nussbaum’s view of a social minimum. A key similarity between the two approaches is that each item on the list – of capabilities or of liberties – can be interpreted in different ways in different cultures and contexts. However, one difference is that Nussbaum elaborates one list while, as we will see in the next section, Pettit thinks that distinct lists of basic capabilities might be relevant at different levels of development.
4.	Freedom, Interdependence and Disability
On the face of things, another potential difference between Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Pettit’s view is that Pettit (2014, p. xix) treats freedom as the sole regulative ideal even if he does not think of it as the only good. In an earlier response to what – in his Development as Freedom - Sen (1999) calls the ‘perspective of freedom’, Nussbaum (2003, p. 44) suggested that ‘the promotion of freedom may not even be a coherent political project’. However, some of the concerns Nussbaum raises about Sen’s views may not be relevant to Pettit’s, not least because Pettit provides a list of basic liberties which must be supported on the basis of the Republican view of freedom. Nonetheless, Pettit’s view is that the promotion of freedom as non-domination clearly requires institutions and laws which allow people to live without being at the mercy of the goodwill of others and thus to avoid certain sorts of ‘asymmetrical dependence’. To this degree, it involves promoting the value of independence.  By contrast, Nussbaum’s view is that asymmetrical interdependence is an unavoidable part of the human condition. In developing her capabilities approach as an account of justice, Nussbaum does not think of people as independent in the way that citizens are conceived in the social contract tradition (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 86-9). Rather she sees people as political animals ‘thoroughly bound up with the interests of others throughout their lives’ so that ‘they depend on others asymmetrically during certain phases of their lives, and some remain in a situation of asymmetrical dependence throughout their lives’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 89). This aspect of Nussbaum’s approach, and more generally the fact that Sen’s statements of the approach as well as Nussbaum’s development of it, allow for human diversity, means that the capability view can fruitfully address some pressing issues relating to disability which – arguably – other approaches, notably social contract views, struggle to come to terms with. 	What is Pettit’s view of interdependence? In Just Freedom Pettit accepts that there are a variety of forms of interdependence that are simply part of life. He notes that: ‘[t]he independence from the will of another that is required under the republican conception of freedom may seem to argue for driving a wedge between individuals, setting each up in a solipsistic sort of independence from society in general or from other people in general’. He goes on to add that: ‘[f]reedom … does not require independence of their preferences in other matters or of the social resources … that reflect those preferences’ (Pettit, 2014, pp. 49 -50). So the kind of dependency which is inconsistent with his view of freedom is dependency of an ‘inimical’ sort (Pettit, 2014, p. 51). 
What view does Pettit take of the dependency of the disabled on the care of others? One context in which this issue emerges is in Pettit’s earlier work Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. There Pettit argues that on the Republican view the state should foster ‘socio-economic independence’. To be ‘independent’ in the relevant sense is to have the ‘wherewithal to operate normally and properly in your society, without having to beg and borrow from others, and without having to depend on their beneficence’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 158).  Pettit associates this idea of ‘socio-economic independence’ with the notion of the ‘basic capability to operate in your society’ which he attributes to Sen. In this context, Pettit provides a rather specific list of capabilities which he thinks one needs to function in a modern society. They include:
… [t]o be able to read and write, to do basic mathematics, to have access to information about matters like work opportunities, medical facilities, transport services, weather forecasts, and to have the resources – a postal address and a telephone number – to make yourself available for contact by others – say, by potential employers. And … to know how to ascertain and assert your legal rights in dealing with the police, with your children’s school, or with your spouse; to know where you can bank your money and how you can use credit facilities; and to have the means of getting about in your local environment and of availing yourself of opportunities for work and leisure. (Pettit, 1997, p. 158)
In advancing this list Pettit is, in part, making the point that in a contemporary society the necessities of life ‘far outstrip’ those in a more traditional society. For this reason, the list of basic capabilities might, on his view, be different in modern and traditional societies. Nonetheless, these abilities are rather different from the crucially important functionings Sen associates with basic capability, and they are also different from those Nussbaum lists. This list is, nonetheless, consistent with the notion of ‘basic functional capability’ Pettit has in mind in Just Freedom. While Sen identifies basic capability failure with poverty, in Pettit’s text such failure would instead point to a failure of socio-economic independence which might expose someone to domination. 
How does Republican theory view the disabled?  Pettit (1997, pp. 160-161) thinks that the handicapped are particularly vulnerable precisely because they can fall seriously short in terms of freedom from non-domination. In particular, he thinks that the handicapped are open to arbitrary interference by those they depend on. In this context, he adds that ‘[i]f I desperately need the help of some particular other or others, as I surely will, then I am going to be in a position where I will not complain against any arbitrary, perhaps petty forms of interference by such agents. I will be disposed to placate them at any cost, putting myself in the classic position of the dominated supplicant’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 160). And Pettit favours promotion of socio-economic independence to lessen this form of vulnerability. By contrast, Nussbaum’s view acknowledges asymmetrical dependence as a pervasive feature of the human condition – and one which needs to be acknowledged in developing a view of justice. Because of this, in her discussion of disability, she is concerned not merely with the capabilities of the disabled but also with those of care givers and with the fact that the burden of care can be crushing (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 170). In particular, she stresses that carers too must attain a threshold in terms of relevant capabilities. In this respect the flavour of Nussbaum’s approach is very different from Pettit’s. 
Nonetheless, and perhaps unsurprisingly, given the points of convergence between capability and Republican views that have already been noted, Nussbaum also encourages independence in some contexts. In the context of certain disabilities she notes that ‘[n]ot so long ago it would have been assumed that even a person who was blind or deaf simply could not participate in sports or perform in a wide range of jobs’ so that ‘[i]impediments that were thoroughly social were seen as natural’. As a consequence ‘it seemed possible to avoid the costly issue of redesigning public facilities to accommodate these people’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 188). She adds that ‘[o]ften the expense was waved away by characterising people with impairments as permanently and inevitably dependent on others …’. And she clearly thinks that dependency in this situation should not be encouraged. For this reason, Nussbaum (2006, p. 189) thinks that: ‘[t]his situation should make us reflect long and hard when we speak about the need for care: for at times the idea that a person needs (unusual or asymmetrical) care is a ruse, masking the possibility of full adult independence for many people with impairments, if only public space could be adequately designed to support them’. Unsurprisingly, the issue of self-respect emerges here and Nussbaum adds that: ‘[p]eople with physical disabilities want medical care for their needs, the way we all do. But they also want to be respected as equal citizens with options for diverse forms of choice and functioning in life, comparable to those of other citizens.’ So again I suggest that there is convergence between the policy implications of the capabilities approach and the Republican view when one acknowledges the importance of self-respect (or the social bases of self-respect) and dignity as Nussbaum does in her articulation of the capabilities approach and Sen often does in his writings.
5.	Conclusions.
In this paper I have argued that while their views are distinct, there is some significant common ground between Philip Pettit’s Republican view of freedom and the capability views developed in the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Because these views are distinct, work on capability and its historical antecedents provide further insight into Nora’s condition in A Doll’s House which is Philip Pettit’s leading example in explaining his view of freedom in Just Freedom. In responding to Pettit, Sen has emphasised that the capability approach and the Republican view capture different aspects of freedom. Nonetheless, Sen’s claim that the capability approach cannot discriminate between various situations where the Republican view can only holds when (as Sen does) we focus on the ability to exercise just one relevant valuable functioning (such as ‘moving around’). Once one allows for more than one valued functioning and includes functionings relating to self-respect and non-humiliation, as Nussbaum does in her list of central human capabilities, capability views can discriminate between the relevant situations. Indeed, in her development of the approach in the context of disability, the importance of capabilities relating to self-respect, dignity and non-humiliation means that her approach sometimes has a flavour which is similar to Pettit’s at the policy level, even though her acceptance of asymmetrical dependence as part of the human condition means that the flavour of her capabilities approach is, in general, quite different to Pettit’s view. Finally, because of the connections between Republican and capability views, it is unsurprising that Pettit uses the language of capability in particular contexts in developing his Republican view. However, his specific use of the notion of ‘basic functional capability’ is quite distinct from Sen’s notion of ‘basic capability’ as well as Nussbaum’s proposal for a social minimum which involves achievement of a threshold level in terms of the central human capabilities on her list.
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^1	  Indeed, in some of the literature it is argued that Sen’s approach can be strengthened through engagement with Pettit’s republicanism. For example, John Alexander claims that ‘Sen’s theory of capabilities can be strengthened and developed … by drawing on resources from Pettit’s republicanism’. (Alexander, 2010, 5-24). I do not here discuss Alexander’s way of relating capability and republicanism in this paper.
